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Abstract: Various forms of assurance are being demanded by different constituen-
cies in the federal public administration. One form of assurance is that of financial 
accountability, and spending reviews are an essential input to processes that contrib-
ute to federal budgetary and expenditure management decisions. Program evalua-
tion has also been an important contributor, but it may be the case that this federal 
function is overextended in that contribution. It may be time to consider removing 
this responsibility and attaching it to other functions, thereby affording the function 
to better focus on what it does best: contribute to program improvement, including 
effectiveness. This would also mean a shift in evaluation culture to one of learning, 
rather than accountability.
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Résume  :  Diverses formes d’imputabilité sont exigées des différents groupes de 
l’administration publique fédérale, dont la responsabilité financière. Les exercices de 
révision budgétaire sont une composante essentielle contribuant aux décisions du 
gouvernement fédéral en matière de gestion budgétaire et de dépenses. L’évaluation 
de programme a joué un rôle important à ce niveau, mais il se peut que le fédéral 
ait des attentes trop élevées concernant sa contribution. Il serait peut-être temps 
d’envisager d’enlever cette responsabilité à l’évaluation et de la rattacher à d’autres 
fonctions, ce qui lui permettrait de se concentrer sur ce qu’elle fait le mieux : con-
tribuer à l’amélioration et l’efficacité des programmes. Cela signifierait aussi que 
la culture de l’évaluation évolue vers une culture d’apprentissage plutôt que vers la 
reddition de comptes.
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IntroductIon
There is little new about expenditure reviews or the role of program evaluations 
to support them. Both are essential instruments and systems supporting deputy 
ministers in their efforts as gatekeepers who must ensure financial scrutiny and 
accountability in their departments/agencies under the Financial Administra-
tion Act. Such instruments and systems provide assurance that such scrutiny is 
adequate and effective by collecting data, monitoring activities, and providing 
assurance that resources are being used in ways that meet the expectations of 
Parliament and the executive. The challenge today is that different forms of as-
surance are being demanded, different systems have been instituted to provide 
forms of assurance, and there are several constituencies that demand one or more 
forms of it. There is a multiplicity of policies, systems, and processes in place at 
the federal level that serve this expanding set of expectations for assurance. For 
program evaluation, however, its roles and responsibilities in the federal system 
have changed many times since it centralized in 1977, including supporting 
expenditure management. The result of both the reforms and the addition of re-
sponsibilities is a function increasingly without a clear sense of itself, despite the 
many iterations of evaluation policies.
To be precise, federal program evaluation has not lived up to the high 
expectations placed on it, and there are many reasons for this, not the least of 
which is that it serves too many purposes, including supporting expenditure 
reviews, and it has many constituencies (Borys, Gauthier, Kishchuk, & Roy, 
2005). Its target of small-p programs also limits its ability to contribute to gov-
ernment-wide decision-making, such as budgeting and expenditure manage-
ment. That is, the function was given the difficult task of providing assurance 
that programs are effective, efficient, and delivered in a cost-efficient manner. 
However, there is an expectation among decision makers that the function can 
do more than enlighten programmatic decisions. The function is expected to 
make an evidence-based link between the effectiveness of program activities 
and budget efficiency (Aucoin, 2005, p. 2). In effect, the targets of study from 
a program focus to budget focus do not line up. Such confusion of responsi-
bilities has led commentators such as Savoie (2013) and others to come to the 
conclusion that the program evaluation function and its products have had no 
noticeable effect on government-wide budgetary decision-making, including 
supporting decisions regarding the expenditure budget. He argues that “little 
has changed over the past twenty years, apart from the fact that more money 
and staff are now being dedicated to the evaluation industry” (Savoie, 2013, 
p. 149).
Others in this volume comment on the limited role that program evalua-
tion has played in expenditure reviews (Mayne, 2018; Dobell & Zussman, 2018; 
Robinson, 2018). However, the particular reasons for this conclusion should not 
go unstated. This paper argues that program evaluation has a role to play in fed-
eral policy and management decision-making, and that it is time for the function 
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to be reformed and expectations from various constituencies to be placed into 
proper alignment. Given the various federal reforms underway in financial man-
agement, this article focuses on the role of program evaluation within the larger 
public administration to support senior decision-makers in their efforts for better 
expenditure management.
It addresses the aims of the article in three parts. First, it explores decision-
making at the federal level, and where program evaluation and expenditure 
reviews fit in that context. Second, it then highlights in historical context the 
forms of assurance to which evaluation contributes, without overly replicating 
the narrative provided by Dobell and Zussman. Third, it draws on 12 interviews 
with senior managers (mainly assistant deputy ministers) and heads of evalu-
ation over the months of May and June 2017 regarding possible areas of weak-
ness in the function and how it can be better aligned with expenditure reviews 
in this era of deliverology. Respondents were asked to consider the role of eval-
uation in assisting with budget making, human resources allocations decisions, 
programmatic improvements, and supporting the Treasury Board Secretariat 
(TBS) expenditure review criteria. The essential purpose of the interviews was 
to determine the strengths and weaknesses of evaluation to support senior 
management decision-making and where they thought the function was per-
forming well. Respondents were also asked the extent to which the function 
might be stretched to the point where it is not or cannot serve a useful pur-
pose. The perspectives of both senior managers and heads of evaluation were 
remarkably homogenous, many of which are reflected in various parts of the 
article.
Federal decIsIon-MakIng crIterIa
Governments have long struggled to find innovative ways to improve certainty 
or the probability that decisions on governmental programs and expenditures are 
optimal. Although decision optimality comes in many different forms, and the 
criteria used to assess it are multiple, every government wants to see that public 
resources are being assigned in a way that maximize effect so that a reasoned 
defence can be made of their record in office. Most often, governments will make 
decisions that optimize fiscal discipline or rigour, program/service effectiveness, 
or political responsiveness to citizen demands (Aucoin, 2005). In particular, much 
has been written on the value and uses of evidence in decision-making regarding 
governmental policy priorities, how public resources are allocated and used, and 
shifts in the role decision makers play in using evidence (S. P. Young, 2013). One 
way that the federal government has ensured that expenditure decisions align with 
performance is expenditure reviews, or what the Canadian federal government re-
fers to most recently as resource allocation reviews (RARs). Expenditure reviews 
can be one-time or ongoing. The current Policy on Results (Canada, TBS, 2016b) 
and Management Accountability Framework (Canada, TBS, 2017), among other 
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policies, formalizes the ongoing review of all direct program and departmental 
spending every 4 years.
Governmental decision-making regarding the determination of priorities 
and the allocation of resources to achieve them is a complex process in which 
evidence, collected from structured or systematic data collection and dynamic 
learning or experience, combines with prevailing ideas at the time, interests, 
epistemologies, institutions, and thought leaders. Each of these factors operates 
at both the political and administrative levels, whereby some forms of evidence 
may take precedence at different times over others (Buss & Shillabeer, 2011). This 
does not imply that one form of evidence is necessarily more rational than the 
other, but that decisions are driven by circumstances in response to planned and 
emergent expectations by governments and citizens (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).
Figure 1 shows the interplay of the different decision criteria and where con-
cerns of budget and resource allocation, expenditure management, and reporting 
and results tend to interact with such criteria. Fiscal discipline refers to manag-
ing both the allocation of scarce resources according to needs and demands, and 
expenditure control within the public services. Both forms of discipline rely on 
effective systems of stewardship. For example, budget allocation requires systems 
that consult various interests, determine revenue levels, make determinations on 
allocations, and adjust budgets where appropriate. Likewise, expenditure manage-
ment involves internal expenditure management and monitoring systems, and 
data gathering and accountability systems such as internal audit and evaluation.
Program and service effectiveness, as a criterion, concerns the extent to which 
expected programmatic effects are being observed and realized. Governments 
Figure 1. Federal Decision-Making Priorities
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want sufficient assurance that what they are doing is leading to expected results. 
Sometimes such decisions take priority, as in the case of Indigenous youth suicide 
and general programs aimed at Indigenous reconciliation. Spending decisions will 
be guided by the extent to which programs are observed to be yielding results that 
align with internal and external expectations.
Political responsiveness concerns both the reality and perception that govern-
ment is responding to internal and external demands for action, or that it is being 
seen to represent various interests, ideas, institutions, and individuals (Howlett, 
2010). Of the three decision-making priorities, this is the most dynamic, and it is 
a necessary part of governmental action. It moves actors and institutions to act, 
for better or worse. As Marland observes in his recent book, Brand Command, 
sometimes a government’s brand can make a government behave to respect its 
own ideas, and at other times it can cause it to ignore or reject rational ways for-
ward (Marland, 2017).
The interplay of these decision criteria is variable and complex. On any given 
priority or decision, one or more of these may take precedence at any given time. 
However, some broad considerations can be drawn between them. When fiscal 
discipline is combined with political responsiveness, usually there is a concern that 
expenditures be controlled, as has been observed during election cycles. When 
fiscal discipline is combined with program effectiveness, there is usually a concern 
that budgets are sufficient to provide assurance that government activities will 
yield desired effects. One often sees these priorities play out during governmental 
budget deliberations and supplemental debates. Finally, when program/service 
effectiveness is combined with political responsiveness, there is often a concern 
for program performance and results. This concern may be observed during times 
when the public is engaged, including current efforts at Indigenous reconciliation 
or foreign trade, or when governments provide reports on their performance, or 
when others such as the auditor general assess programs and services.
The specific role of program evaluation was regarded as an innovation in the 
1970s, but its role supporting these different decision criteria has changed many 
times since. New public management (NPM) aims for results-based management 
and reporting have guided the objectives of the function, but even these purposes 
within NPM have shifted between fiscal discipline, performance monitoring, and 
program effectiveness. The extent of evaluation’s contribution to governmental 
decision-making and expenditure management has proved to be less than stel-
lar (see Bourgeois & Whynot, 2018), due mainly to confused responsibilities as 
evaluation contributes to governmental decision-making priorities (Segsworth, 
1990; Shepherd, 2011). The sources of this confusion are important to consider 
to reorient the function.
assurance and the Federal PolIcy context
To achieve the aims of fiscal discipline, program effectiveness, and politi-
cal responsiveness, various forms of assurance are needed to support political 
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decision-making. The present pattern is that cabinet and departmental decision-
making is highly centralized and concentrated in the hands of the prime minister 
and senior advisors (Savoie, 1999, 2010; Dunn, 2010). Decisions regarding the 
connections between public policy and programmatic decisions related to design, 
implementation and resource utilization, are fueled by shifting political respon-
siveness to public needs and wants, implementation of election promises, and 
personal priorities of the prime minister and, to some extent, of cabinet. Typically, 
the Canadian system is highly centralized and concentrated, because there are 
fewer checks on central power (Savoie, 2010). Such concentration has allowed 
for much greater emphasis on fiscal discipline, a decision criterion that voters 
demand as a matter of routine. The key to success for the Harper government 
was the near obsession with fiscal balance to the exclusion of other priorities 
at times (Evans & Albo, 2011). Greater attention to fiscal discipline is attrib-
uted to heightened public demands for financial transparency, results achieve-
ment, and value-for-money. Likewise, various media are becoming vigilant 
to check government financial decisions, and the extent to which duplication 
with provincial/territorial activities is kept to a minimum (Aucoin, 2012). Such 
pressures have required careful attention to ongoing expenditure review and 
resource allocation in response to changing priorities. Interestingly, however, 
it has also meant more attention to program effectiveness and results achieve-
ment as governments are regarded increasingly as incapable of addressing more 
complex problems (Noveck, 2015).
These changes have meant that governments rely on various forms of assur-
ance to give evidence that fiscal discipline is being maintained and that programs 
are performing optimally. Table 1 summarizes the various forms of assurance pro-
vided by internal and external systems, and the policy frameworks that support 
them. More importantly, these forms of assurance speak to different purposes and 
target audiences. At a minimum, there are at least five forms of assurance that are 
demanded by different decision actors: policy and program coherence, systems 
improvement, internal program performance, government-wide performance, 
and public accountability. Each form of assurance can individually or collectively 
support one or more decision criteria in Figure 1.
The role of policy and program evaluation can be observed in each of these 
various assurance forms, oftentimes with overlapping and layering of purposes. 
Such assurance speaks to the interaction and complexity of internal assurance 
and accountability functions, such as program evaluation as it contributes to 
several policy frameworks and instruments. To be clear, it is no longer the 
case that program evaluation focuses exclusively, if it ever did, on summative 
concerns for results. It has also been concerned with formative questions of 
program design and implementation, value for money, system and service gaps, 
public accountability, and, in rare cases, policy coherence and rationale (Shep-
herd, 2011). Evaluations serve a multiplicity of purposes, and the function itself 
is asked to contribute to several departmental and central agency projects, in-
cluding ongoing expenditure reviews. With so many competing and overlapping 
Expenditure Reviews and the Federal Experience 353
CJPE 32.3, 347–370 © 2018doi: 10.3138/cjpe.43180
table 1. Forms of Assurance and Policy Frameworks
Form of  
assurance
Purpose of  
assurance
Policy  
frameworks
Target for  
assurance
Policy and  
program coherence
•   Relevance and  
coherence of 
policy ideas
•   Assess program 
relevance against 
ideas
•   External audit 
(OAG)
•  Evaluation/results
•  Internal audit
 
•  Parliamentarians
•   Senior depart-
mental and  
central executives
Internal program 
performance
•   Monitor program 
implementation
•   Monitor  
expenditures
 
•   Evaluation/results 
(PIPs/performance 
Measurement)
•   Expenditure 
review
•   Senior depart-
mental and  
central executives
Government  
performance
•   Governmental 
election targets
•   Program  
coordination
•  Evaluation/results
•   Expenditure  
management
•  Ministers
•  Central executives
Systems  
improvement
•   Quality  
improvement
•   Performance 
improvement
•   Assess system 
gaps
•  MAF
•  Evaluation/results
•  Internal audit
•   Senior depart-
mental executives
•   Senior corporate 
services managers
Public  
accountability
•   Governmental  
accountability  
for performance
•  CIO/CHRO/CFO
•  Evaluation/results
•  Parliament
•  Public
responsibilities, it is small wonder that federal evaluation has become cumber-
some and finds itself in difficulty managing a plethora of demands and expecta-
tions from various constituencies. One can also argue that its less than stellar 
performance can be attributed to doing too many things, under conditions of 
constantly shifting demands and within a policy framework that is not clearly 
linked to decision-making. In effect, the relevance of the function is constantly 
being questioned by increasingly more governmental actors (Shepherd, 2011; 
Savoie, 2013, 2015, pp. 182–186).
the contrIbutIon oF PrograM evaluatIon to  
ProvIdIng assurance
The following provides a series of narratives on the contribution of program evalu-
ation to the various forms of assurance, including, most notably, decision-making 
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with respect to fiscal discipline and program effectiveness. The narratives on each 
of the forms of assurance show the multiple and sometimes competing purposes 
of the function, and that evaluation is not ideally suited to supporting expendi-
ture reviews. Figure 2 provides key turning points in the overall narratives of 
expenditure reforms and reviews, and illustrates how the program evaluation 
function and its several reforms have played out with respect to serving expendi-
ture reviews. Using the various forms of assurance, these turning points can be 
understood from several perspectives, including changes to government policy on 
managing transparency, accountability, and program effectiveness.
Policy and Program Coherence
Cabinets of the pre-1970s period from the Depression onward examined policy 
and program proposals collectively through an elaborate array of cabinet com-
mittees intended at the time to bring coherence to the diffused system of decen-
tralized ministry decision-making that served the country well through the war 
years. In a system where powerful individual ministers held sway in cabinet, the 
value of evidence to convince colleagues of their policy ideas was critical (Aucoin 
& French, 1974; Dunn, 2010). Cabinets invariably gave way to powerful ministers. 
Federally, “there appeared to be a symbiotic relationship between effectiveness 
evaluation and Cabinet decision-making. This symbiosis was based, to some 
extent, on confidence in a highly technocratic and professional public service” 
(Shepherd, 2011, p. 6).
It made sense, then, that under this form of decision-making the idea or 
definition of “programs” was any activity of government on a small or large 
scale, referred to as big-P programs. Cabinet was able to weave together a vision 
of its overall policy program or government-wide initiatives (big-P programs) 
expressed through the Speech from the Throne. Evaluations were focused on 
Figure 2. Timeline of Reforms: Expenditure Reviews and Evaluation
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examining matters of relevance at the level of policy ideas and the extent to which 
big-P programs served to meet policy expectations of cabinet. One challenge at 
the time, however, was that line budgeting conducted at the centre of government 
determined ministry allocations that were out of step with policy-level thinking. 
That is, budgeting was conceived on the basis of the number of desks, people, and 
pads of paper, rather than as a coordinated “program” to resolve a policy problem. 
The combination of the Glassco Commission recommendations to “let the man-
agers manage” and decentralize financial management and planning authority to 
ministries, and the introduction of the Planning, Programming Budgeting System 
(PPBS) in 1968 and the Policy and Expenditure Management System (PEMS) in 
1978, shifted the conception of “program” radically. The Planning Programming 
and Budgeting Guide now defined program to mean “a collection of activities hav-
ing the same objective or set of objectives” (Canada, TBS, 1969). That is, programs 
were considered a collection of ministry or departmental micro-activities, rather 
than a government-level big-P initiative.
When the Evaluation Policy was first instituted in 1977, its focus was to be 
on small-p programs resident within individual ministries or departments and 
on prescribed questions about micro-program accountability and performance, 
rather than questions of policy relevance and higher-order outcomes orientation 
(Jordan & Sutherland, 1979). This was eventually reinforced by directives from the 
newly created Office of the Comptroller General in 1978, despite recommenda-
tions from the Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability 
(Lambert Commission) in 1979 that evaluations contribute to big-P programs 
and report on all programs on a 5-year cycle. The introduction of the Operational 
Performance Measurement System (OPM) in 1973 further shifted the focus of 
evaluation from program effectiveness to program performance. Between the 
PPBS and OPM, the role of internal evaluation was solidified to enable “adequate 
and reliable means, wherever feasible, for performance measurement” (Canada, 
TBS, 1976, p. 5). At the time, the function did not believe it could properly assess 
program effectiveness, program performance, and fiscal accountability simulta-
neously (Shepherd, 2011, p. 7). The problem was, and remains, that evaluations 
geared to assess micro-programs are not placed well to assess budget allocations 
or expenditures regarding big-P programmatic or summative issues: the targets 
of analysis are at different levels of perspective.
The 1977 Evaluation Policy had cast the function in a way that manifested in 
the decentralized governance structure that remains in place to this day. Evalua-
tion was regarded as a management tool to support departmental decision makers 
in improving essentially the efficiency of their activities. In 1981, TBS directed 
departments to collect performance information to include in their annual esti-
mates to Parliament. However, the type of performance information to include 
was left to the judgement of program managers, without tying such information 
to policy-level outcomes. This further reinforced the role of internal evaluation 
to support small-p programs, and to assist program managers in their efforts to 
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collect output-level data, rather than outcomes or effects of programs. Amend-
ments to the Financial Administration Act in 1984 further required departments 
to gauge value for money of small-p programs, reinforcing the evaluation’s em-
phasis on programmatic activities and outputs.
In 1993, the auditor general concluded in a scathing audit of the evaluation 
function that “priority has been given to meeting the needs of departmental man-
agers. As a result, evaluations examine smaller program units or lower-budget ac-
tivities and focus on operational performance. They are less likely to challenge the 
existence of a program or to evaluate its cost-effectiveness” (Canada, Office of the 
Auditor General [OAG], 1993, sec. 9.2). The same audit recommended that evalu-
ations should be subject to external review to improve objectivity (sec. 10.2), that 
timeliness and relevance could be linked to activities such as ongoing expenditure 
reviews (sec. 10.4), and that the function could be better linked to decision-maker 
needs (sec. 10.6). In effect, it was concluded that, for program evaluation to be 
more effective, it must have an effective entry into decision-making. This conclu-
sion has been reached many times since by other commentators (Shepherd, 2011; 
Savoie, 2013), including other articles in this volume.
The focus on evaluation as a management function was reinforced with 
the 2001 Evaluation Policy, which emanated from the Results for Canadians 
initiative in 2000, and manifested in a results-based management orientation 
(G. Young, 2006). The Results for Canadians policy called for better man-
agement of programs and services, and integrating departmental activities 
into policy decisions. The challenge, however, was that the function could not 
evaluate all departmental programs and services, thereby building a compre-
hensive picture of overall departmental performance (Dumaine, 2012, p. 68). 
With the introduction of the 2009 Evaluation Policy, departments and agen-
cies were required to assess all direct program spending, and the administra-
tive aspects of all statutory spending on a 5-year cycle. This built on previous 
efforts emanating, from the 2007 budget, that all grants and contributions 
programs also be evaluated on a 5-year cycle. Ultimately, however, the cov-
erage requirements proved not to work. In the fall of 2009, the auditor gen-
eral released a chapter, “Evaluating the Effectiveness of Programs” (Canada, 
OAG, 2009), concluding that departmental evaluations covered a relatively 
low proportion of its program expenses—between five and thirteen percent 
annually across the six departments [and that] the audited departments do 
not regularly identify and address weaknesses in effectiveness evaluation” 
(sec. 2.11). This coverage requirement has since been removed in the Policy on 
Results 2016, with a shift to risk-based assessment of programs to be evaluated 
in the “program inventory” (secs. 4.3, 15.2). The challenge now is that many 
evaluations are focusing on multiple programs in the same report with no co-
herent general picture for assessing departmental spending and performance. 
That said, the new policy holds the promise of aligning program results with 
governmental policy priorities. This might assist with creating evidence that 
better supports expenditure reviews, according to respondents.
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Internal Program Performance
Program evaluation has long focused on internal small-p program effective-
ness and performance as a form of assurance (Shepherd, 2011). However, it has 
not always been clear how such evaluations inform departmental expenditure 
reviews. The main challenge, as noted, was that the targets of assessment are 
misaligned. Whereas evaluations assess program effects (either formatively or 
summatively), expenditure reviews aim to reduce overall departmental spend-
ing, and, by extension, government-wide expenditures. In addition, evaluations 
have not typically tracked the connections between program performance and 
effects, given that there has often been a dearth of performance measurement 
information. To fill this information gap, the 2001 Evaluation Policy required 
departments to establish ongoing performance monitoring and measurement, 
and many efforts since the 2007 budget have been made to improve performance 
information supporting expenditure reviews. During the 2001 policy period, 
evaluation was driven by central agency concerns for accountability and, to a 
much lesser extent, by program improvement and renewal (Borys et al., 2005). 
It required that TBS submissions for new programs include a Results-based 
Management and Accountability Framework (RMAF), which was essentially an 
evaluation plan that included the construction of logic models which had two 
purposes: to show the connection between program activities and spending; 
and, to demonstrate the connection between ultimate results and governmental 
level policy objectives.
The objective of the 2009 Evaluation Policy was “to create a comprehen-
sive and reliable base of evaluation evidence that is used to support policy and 
program improvement, expenditure management, cabinet decision-making, 
and public reporting” (Canada, TBS, 2009, sec. 5.1). The policy further defines 
evaluation as “the systematic collection and analysis of evidence on the outcomes 
of programs to make judgements about their relevance, performance, and alter-
native ways to deliver them or to achieve the same results” (Canada, TBS, 2009, 
sec. 3.1). The combination of both sections of the policy demonstrates the scope 
of the challenge for evaluation: there are multiple purposes dependent on per-
formance measurement and several forms of assurance demanded for different 
audiences. The ambitions for the function are simply too high and destined to 
fail. If this were not enough, the policy makes a shift toward value-for-money as 
a principal aim in an effort to better support expenditure reviews. The challenge 
of the 100% coverage requirement was difficult to satisfy, making the function’s 
overall contribution to departmental expenditure reviews questionable at the 
very least.
The new Policy on Results 2016 places increased emphasis on department-lev-
el performance measurement and less on program effectiveness, thereby further 
limiting the evaluation function’s efficacy. Again, the theory is that, by building a 
comprehensive picture of program performance, departmental performance can 
be assessed. This has proved elusive to date, and it will be interesting as to whether 
the issue will be resolved in the new policy.
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Whole-of-Government Performance
Several efforts have been made to improve assurance for governmental per-
formance, including the new Policy on Results 2016 as the latest attempt. The 
managerial alignment of spending with priorities was observed most notably 
with the Lambert Commission, which recommended in 1979 that central con-
trols over departmental spending be fortified in response to a blistering auditor 
general report in 1976 accusing the government of “losing control over the public 
purse” (Canada, OAG, 1976, sec. 1.2). Lambert proposed the creation of a fiscal 
plan for government, covering 5-year periods, which, when supported by data 
gathered through the OPM, would see the federal government allocate resources 
according to central priorities within budgetary limitations. Fiscal plans were 
set by the Treasury Board, Privy Council Office, and the Department of Finance 
with the effect that spending limits were now placed on departmental spending 
(Sutherland, 1986, pp. 119–124). In 1985, the Conservative government of Brian 
Mulroney established a taskforce led by Finance Minister Erik Nielsen to reduce 
the public service by 15,000 positions within 3 to 5 years and make programs and 
services more efficient and effective. The evaluation function was called upon to 
provide relevant assessments of program performance and spending that sup-
ported government-level decisions. However, its input was regarded largely as 
ineffectual, as the function could not support efforts to provide information on 
strategic-level objectives (Mayne, 1986, pp. 98–100).
In 1993, an important study by former Clerk of the Privy Council Gordon 
Osbaldeston concluded that, despite important shifts in management resulting 
from PPBS and PEMS to improve departmental financial management, the role 
of TBS should be shifted from ensuring accountability and control to one that 
creates the conditions necessary for better management. This led to increased 
political direction and control over financial management, resulting in more cen-
tralization of decision-making (Osbaldeston, 1989). A second one-time program 
review was conducted under Jean Chrétien in 1994 to improve the management 
of government, which acknowledged that any policy expenditure management 
system must be fully integrated with systems of budgetary review that accounted 
for government priorities that drew on evidence about program effectiveness. 
The program review exercise was successful in ensuring that spending aligned 
with policy priorities, and there is evidence to suggest that program effectiveness 
was considered in spending allocations, but mainly it was an exercise in fiscal 
discipline (Paquet & Shepherd, 1996). TBS played a major role to set budget 
reduction targets, departments carried out their own reviews and reduction rec-
ommendations to the centre, and cabinet along with senior public service officials 
played a challenge role in the recommendations posed by departments (Paquet & 
Shepherd, 1996). The role of evaluation was once again questioned in this process, 
as it failed to deliver the kind of information needed to support fiscal discipline 
decisions (Müller-Clemm & Barnes, 1997).
Following the experiences of that program review exercise, a new Expendi-
ture Management System (EMS) was instituted in 1995 to replace PEMS with 
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a greater role for the finance minister and prime minister in financial manage-
ment decisions. There were three main goals of the EMS. First, programs would 
continue to be reviewed on an ongoing basis, especially where departments were 
requesting new money. Second, annual targets were set for deficit reduction, and 
achieved through A-based reviews. Lastly, all new expenditure proposals for new 
programs would be considered by the minister of finance, and accommodated in 
the budget and fiscal framework.
The challenge for this new system, however, was that it did not provide for 
a continuous process of expenditure review and reallocation for the whole of 
government, a role assumed directly by the prime minister and finance minister. 
Program evaluation under this system was reduced to simply providing perfor-
mance measurement evidentiary support for budget reviews, solidified under a 
new review policy instituted in 1994. However, a significant change was that all 
new funding proposals were to be accompanied by an evaluation plan, as required 
in the 1994 Evaluation and Review Policy. Submissions were to address seven 
program review questions and to demonstrate how the program would achieve its 
objectives (Shepherd, 2011, pp. 9–11), which further reinforced evaluation’s role 
supporting mainly fiscal discipline.
In 2007, so as to support a whole-of-government approach to decision-
making, the Treasury Board instituted the Management, Resources, and Results 
Structure Policy (MRRS), which stipulated the performance effectiveness and 
evidence orientation to demonstrate departmental results (Canada, TBS, 2007). 
The policy required that departments identify clear and measurable strategic-level 
outcomes, an effective governance structure to achieve such results, and a detailed 
“Program Activity [Alignment] Architecture,” which would ensure a results fo-
cus. Departmental evaluations were to serve this framework and provide input 
to outcomes-level decision-making. The challenge under this approach, which 
still persists today, is that programmatic activities might address more than one 
strategic outcome, making it difficult to separate expenditures supporting any one 
outcome. The level of program assurance needed to support government-wide 
reporting was and remains limited.
Also in 2007, the Harper government announced the formal ongoing stra-
tegic review initiative in its budget as a way to re-establish the policy and ex-
penditure decision-making connection observed in the 1994 program review. 
The initiative sought to find cost savings of approximately $2.8 billion. The Privy 
Council Office was afforded the main policy challenge responsibility, observed 
also in the program review. In short, strategic review was a mandatory process for 
all federal departments and agencies to assess all of their direct program spending, 
including the operational costs of statutory programs on a 4-year cycle. Direct 
program spending also included financial contributions made to third-party de-
livery organizations such as First Nations governments on-reserve, sports granting 
bodies, research organizations, such as universities, and health organizations car-
rying out drug tests, to name a few. It also included ongoing operating and capital 
spending to deliver programs such as Veterans services and regional economic 
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development. What was not included in strategic reviews was transfers to indi-
viduals (tax expenditure programs, for example) and other orders of government, 
which represents approximately 45%–50% of all federal spending.
Departments and agencies were required to respect two key conditions sur-
rounding the operation of strategic reviews. First, they were to address the program 
review’s seven questions in a cascading scale of priorities. Second, departments 
and agencies “are required to identify reallocation options totaling 5 percent from 
their lowest-priority, lowest performing program spending,” and channeling the 
“savings” to high-priority and high-performing programs identified by central 
decision makers. The result of the 2007–2010 series of strategic reviews was less 
about reinvestment, and more about deficit reduction similar to that of the 1994 
program review exercise (Dumaine, 2012, p. 67). The role of program evaluation 
was to contribute as one of several sources of information. Other sources included 
reports from the Management Accountability Framework instituted in 2003 to 
provide ongoing performance information of internal departmental and agency 
operating systems and management strength. Additional sources included audit 
reports, program performance reports, and external reports, such as those from 
the auditor general.
The strategic reviews initiative was expanded in the 2011 federal budget and 
renamed the Strategic and Operating Review (SOR) initiative, which was intended 
as a 1-year process led by the Treasury Board to identify efficiencies in the public 
service, including assessments of salaries, benefits, and outsourcing of work. As 
opposed to strategic reviews, SORs 
will examine direct program spending, as appropriated by Parliament. About $80 
billion of direct program spending will be reviewed with the objective of achieving 
at least $4 billion in ongoing annual savings by 2014–15 or 5 percent of the review 
base. The review will place particular emphasis on generating savings from operating 
expenses and improving productivity, while also examining the relevance and effec-
tiveness of programs. (Government of Canada, 2011, p. 182) 
Like the strategic review exercise, SORs did not include transfers to individuals 
and other governments. Whereas the strategic review exercise did not lead to any 
major reductions in people and program spending, SORs did produce significant 
reductions between 2013 and 2015 in planned operating spending, and public 
service positions (Rounce & Levasseur, 2015, pp. 29–35).
In both cases of strategic reviews and SORs, program evaluation has been 
observed as not living up to expectations on serving expenditure reviews (Lester, 
2015). The latest Policy on Results 2016, which replaces the 2009 Evaluation 
Policy, aims to “improve the achievement of results across government; and [to] 
enhance the understanding of the results government seeks to achieve, does 
achieve, and the resources used to achieve them” (Canada, TBS, 2016b, sec. 3.1). 
The policy is premised on the work of Sir Michael Barber (2010), and his con-
cept of deliverology, which is a manifestation of results-based management that 
highlights political results and their measurement from the centre of government, 
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and emphasizes a whole-of-government approach. Government-level results are 
gathered through delivery units that coordinate with other results-measurement 
functions, such as internal audit and program evaluation. The focus of the policy 
is performance measurement, and is much less about program effectiveness, 
which accords with the UK model of program assessment (Schacter, 2016). The 
entire focus of the policy is to improve government-wide performance results 
against centrally contrived targets, which is aided by a new role for the Treasury 
Board to carry out government-wide evaluations (Canada, TBS, 2016b, sec. 5.2.3). 
The question is whether program evaluation can contribute effectively in this 
model, which is addressed in the next section and by Dobell and Zussman (2018). 
There are those, including Montague, who believe a move to greater performance 
measurement with a proper focus on targets can improve government-wide 
performance reporting (Montague, 2016). The real question is whether program 
effectiveness will be considered a priority as well.
Systems Improvement
Also arising from the Results for Canadians initiative was attention to ideal man-
agement systems and practices. This culminated in the creation of the Manage-
ment Accountability Framework (MAF) “to develop a comprehensive system that 
would attempt to gauge and report on the quality of management of departments 
and agencies, and encourage improvement every year” (Lindquist, 2010, p. 51). It 
was designed to improve management performance in 10 areas of management 
including accountability, results, and performance. The MAF has undergone 
several amendments, with the most recent update in 2016, focusing on leader-
ship and strategic direction, and results and accountability. Each year selected 
departments and agencies undergo MAF assessment, culminating in an annual 
government-wide report on the state of management practices and performance 
(Canada, TBS, 2016a). Such assessments are tied directly to the Policy on Results, 
and the evaluation and internal audit functions are assessed on their ability to 
support effective departmental management and expenditure decisions. In addi-
tion, these functions are also expected to contribute evidence that supports MAF 
assessments at the department level. Again, the same challenge exists that these 
functions tend to operate at the micro-program level and are not well positioned 
to contribute to larger questions of management practice beyond program man-
agement.
Public Accountability
A final form of assurance to which evaluation contributes is public accountabil-
ity. The principal target audience of public accountability reporting, including 
departmental performance reports, for example, are Parliament and the public. 
Evaluation contributes to preparing public reports that are typically posted on 
departmental and central agency websites. However, the clear link between pro-
grammatic activities and departmental performance is often unclear (Savoie, 
2013). Various evidentiary forms, such as evaluation reports, are submitted to 
362  Shepherd
© 2018 CJPE 32.3, 347–370 doi: 10.3138/cjpe.43180
chief information officers (CIOs), chief human resources officers (CHROs), and 
chief financial officers (CFOs) to glean what they can on higher-level performance 
findings. At best, evaluation reports can highlight programmatic conclusions, 
but they contribute in a cursory way to departmental performance. That said, 
some departments are able to use evaluation findings to build a performance 
and expenditure management picture more effectively than others, but these are 
a minority.
exPendIture revIews: realIgnIng the PrograM 
evaluatIon FunctIon
There have been multiple academic and expert papers, academic conferences, 
and government symposia regarding how to adjust the federal evaluation func-
tion since 1977, and this article is but one more in a long line. The particular twist 
in this article is how to make program evaluation more relevant for purposes of 
expenditure reviews and results-based management in general. Evaluation to this 
point has been in place mainly to serve the accountability requirements of govern-
ment (Turpin, 2009, p. 7), and this is both an asset and limitation. It is an asset 
because it focuses the function on specific objectives. It is a limitation because the 
function is capable of more than contributing to fiscal decision-making, which has 
been observed as less than stellar to date. The following provides general thoughts, 
collected from respondents, on where the function might better focus its energies 
and competencies.
Evaluation as a Core Function of Public Management: PM Is Not 
Enough
Aucoin (2005) recognized that evaluation is a core function, “because it seeks 
to ascertain and assess the effectiveness of government programs in achieving 
desired results, impacts and outcomes.” He argues, rightfully, that a core function 
of any government is to be responsive to citizen needs and that programs operate 
to maximize benefit. He further argues that
results-based management [read Policy on Results] except insofar as it fully incorpo-
rates program evaluation, is no substitute for program evaluation, however useful 
it may be for management control and improvement. Performance measurement 
regimes do not seek to ascertain or assess program effectiveness. Rather, they seek 
to determine the extent to which departments achieve results or outcomes. They 
measure achievement against targets. They do not attempt to explain or account for 
the performance in question, let alone the effectiveness of their programs. . . . Pro-
gram evaluation is not just another initiative: it is a core function of governance and 
management. (p. 6)
That “evaluation” has been removed in the new Policy on Results is telling in 
what may be argued is a diminished role. Equally telling is the emphasis on re-
sults, defined as stated results against prescribed targets, using deliverology-style 
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performance measurement as the preferred approach to assessing them. Although 
concerns for program effectiveness are identified in the policy (Canada, TBS, 
2016b) and the glossary to the policy, such concerns are not stated anywhere else 
in the substance of the policy, despite promises in the mandate letter to Treasury 
Board Minister Scott Brison to research questions of program effects:
Take a leadership role to review policies to improve the use of evidence and data 
in program innovation and evaluation, more open data, and a more modern ap-
proach to comptrollership . . . [and to] work with the Minister of Finance and your 
colleagues to conduct a review of the expenditures and other spending to reduce 
poorly targeted and inefficient resources, wasteful spending, and government initia-
tives that are ineffective or have outlived their purpose. (Canada, Office of the Prime 
Minister, 2016)
The point may be semantic, but it appears evident that results units within the fed-
eral bureaucracy, accompanied by evaluators and other monitoring functions are 
to focus on performance measurement as the key to assessing results achievement. 
Respondents interviewed for this paper expressed concern that the “usefulness” 
of evaluation as a function has gone too far to follow the UK approach to per-
formance measurement. More importantly, the centralization of priority setting, 
manifested as performance measures and targets, could mean that researching 
program effectiveness as a core function of government, and the capacity to un-
derstand it in ways other than through internally derived performance data, may 
be vastly diminished as time goes on.
Evaluation Clients and Purposes Must Be Aligned:  
Trust Is Critical to Success
As argued throughout this paper, there are several clients of evaluation. However, 
the function is designed mainly to serve program managers. This is revealed in 
the types of questions raised by evaluations. They tend often to be concerned with 
formative questions of program efficiency, cost-efficiency, and outputs achieve-
ment. Senior management was not included often in the scoping of evaluations in 
the past nor in the communication of results through departmental performance 
reports, which did not contribute much to the usefulness of the function. Techni-
cal advisory committees for evaluations more often than not comprise program 
officials, which limits significantly the scope of evaluation questions and the lati-
tude of evaluators to ask tough or probing research questions. With greater use of 
outside beneficiaries and experts, technical advisory committees would be able to 
scope evaluations beyond simply a programmatic focus. This may not always be 
appropriate, but it would afford these committees the ability (and permission) to 
consider broader issues of policy ideas, user focus, and innovative methods that 
take into consideration other epistemological frameworks.
One obvious benefit of the Policy on Results, is that performance measure-
ment has focused senior managers to consider results that are of interest to the 
Cabinet Committee on Results. In this regard, deputy ministers are concerned 
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with the information that is relayed to ministers, because that information must 
be pertinent to central decision-making and supported by performance data. 
There is now much greater potential to scope evaluation reports to serve a results 
focus, as envisioned in the policy. The next challenge would be to also reincor-
porate program effectiveness in the traditional sense (i.e., the extent to which 
programs are observed to cause or contribute to achieving expected effects).
With respect to expenditure reviews as a specific form of inquiry, senior de-
partmental and central agency decision makers and evaluation units would have 
to create a trust relationship that allows for conversations not as much about costs 
as aligning spending with departmental objectives and central agency priorities 
and broadly defined meta-program objectives at the departmental and central 
government levels. One concern with the Policy on Results is that it focuses atten-
tion too heavily on centrally derived priorities to the exclusion of department-
level objectives, which are based in legislative obligations. Central priorities get 
attention: ongoing departmental programs and services often do not. Or, it may 
not be obvious as to the connection between routine and ongoing activities and 
programs with central priorities. A few departments have included evaluation 
units in strategic-level decision-making on expenditure reviews, but this is not 
commonplace. It requires evaluation heads with a great deal of organizational 
confidence and moral authority to make this work, and to make their usefulness 
in such conversations crystal clear. Data sharing and expertise are essential ingre-
dients in this trust relationship between those carrying out evaluations and those 
performing resource alignment reviews.
Building on this trust relationship means moving away from the account-
ability focus of evaluations that characterized both the 2001 and 2009 evaluation 
policies with a highly mechanized adherence to centrally derived questions. 
Evaluation units now would have to be reformed to be consultative and responsive 
to both program and strategic management needs. In this regard, evaluations have 
to be much more learning and problem-solving oriented than simply the ticking 
off of accountability boxes. Although coverage remains a requirement under 
Section 42.1 of the Financial Administration Act for grants and contributions 
programs, there is sufficient latitude in the coverage requirements in the Policy on 
Results to allow evaluation units to better calibrate direct spending coverage with 
programmatic and strategic needs, including expenditure management decision-
making (Dumaine, 2012, pp. 71–72).
Equally important, a trust relationship has to be built between heads of evalua-
tion and TBS. Given the compliance focus of the 2009 policy especially, TBS tended 
to be highly critical and prescriptive in its direction to departmental evaluation 
units. The role of evaluation in expenditure reviews was not clear from the centre, 
further eroding confidence in the TBS to create the conditions necessary for a use-
ful contribution. The new policy provides an alternative approach: to place evalu-
ation in the position of trusted advisor as indicated. The challenge for the centre 
of government will be to create the space needed for trust to be built with senior 
central decision makers. The challenge is this flexibility is not being used.
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Balancing Interests: Evaluation Use and Who Should Conduct  
Expenditure Reviews?
Questions about whether program evaluation has a role to play in expenditure 
reviews have been swirling since the Evaluation Policy was instituted in 1977. 
As shown, evaluation units have been ill-equipped to contribute meaningfully 
in this respect despite attempts since the 2009 Evaluation Policy to better link 
evaluation with the strategic reviews initiative and its successor versions. It is 
fairly safe to conclude that there is significant structural resistance to contribut-
ing to expenditure reviews as long as the function is aligned to serving program 
managers and resident in departments. It may be time to accept the conclusion 
that Mayne (2018) has come to, which is that expenditure evaluations be adopted 
as a separate evaluation tool. The question then becomes, who may be better 
positioned to carry these out?
The usefulness of evaluations has long been discussed in the literature (Shulha 
& Cousins , 1997; Borys et al., 2005). A major conclusion from the various lit-
erature is that there has been a significant expansion of conceptions of use from 
the individual to the organization levels. In short, evaluation uses and users have 
changed and expanded, leading to heightened expectations on the value of evalu-
ation in decision-making. It would seem to make sense that evaluations cannot 
serve all of these expectations well. Building on the last observation, it may be 
time to apply the application of “full-meal deal” evaluations only when consid-
erations of effects are warranted. There should also be “evaluation-lite” options, 
where very specific questions are being posed, such as value-for-money analyses. 
Creating specialized evaluation functions to address the several expectations 
related to timing, usefulness, scope, depth, and breadth may be an idea that has 
come of age in this time of “experimentation.” In other words, building a toolkit of 
evaluation types based on more than one epistemological framework is warranted 
to address different questions and expectations.
There may be justification for at least three possibilities in this regard. First, a 
unit could be created in the Treasury Board Secretariat that is trained to carry out 
these sorts of reviews (Mayne, 2018). Resources would have to be made available, 
given that TBS is in no way prepared to handle such a role at present. As Mayne 
suggests, there is merit to understanding the financial performance of programs 
from a central agency perspective. As there may be better positioned to provide 
a whole-of-government rationale for results. Although Mayne is referring to the 
effectiveness performance of programs, it is equally the case that financial perfor-
mance of departmental and governmental activities may be better assessed from 
a holistic point of view. In addition, assessing governmental decision-making on 
the basis of go and no-go, using cost information, is not likely to be meaning-
ful, as calculating value for money may be quite complicated, especially from a 
qualitative perspective. Rarely can programs be assessed mechanistically, despite 
the rhetoric of deliverology to the contrary. Also, TBS is better suited to get the 
timing right for linking expenditure evaluations to the budget cycle, rather than 
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relying on departmental program-based evaluations to somehow be timely with 
multiple planning and deadline expectations.
A second idea is to maintain a decentralized approach and house expenditure 
evaluation within departmental strategic planning or policy branches. Aside from 
the benefits of growing separate expertise, such units are better able to raise evalu-
ation from a small-p focus to a higher-level of analysis and perspective. Although 
assuming responsibilities for comptrollership may be considered out of place for 
such units, it nonetheless makes better sense to unlink this type of evaluation from 
current structures. One could go so far as to argue that the experience of some 
departments, and small agencies in particular, is that some equivalent unit is at 
least coordinating these sorts of reviews at present anyway. The implementation 
challenge would be coordinating with TBS on a manageable template for review, 
and getting the timing right. The next challenge would then be the unit of analysis, 
whether this is to be programs or clusters of activities in the program inventory.
The benefit of actors other than evaluation units conducting expenditure re-
views is that the burden of budgetary and economic considerations in program 
evaluations is removed. Although program evaluations are getting better at value-for-
money analyses, the unit of measure is still out of alignment with programs being the 
centre of assessment. In addition, the users of expenditure review information tend to 
prefer quantitative or economic analysis of departmental activities, something again 
that program evaluations are not always able to provide definitively.
Regardless of which idea is embraced, the usefulness of program evaluations 
would continue to factor into expenditure reviews. One way to contribute that 
serves the Policy on Results would be to use evaluation expertise in the develop-
ment of realistic and appropriate targets. As Montague (2016) suggests, program 
evaluators may be well-suited to identifying policy or program problems, gaps 
and opportunities, engaging stakeholder interests (both internal and external) to 
develop appropriate targets, tying them to behavioural change logic frameworks, 
and then linking them to life cycle plans at the program- or policy-level of change. 
In this regard, getting the targeting right leads to better measurement of outcomes, 
which may actually improve the allocation of resources.
concludIng thoughts
The article highlights in a detailed way some of the reasons why federal program 
evaluation has not performed well in supporting expenditure reviews. By moving 
through such a diagnosis a discussion on realignment may be better annotated. In 
overall terms, it is hoped that a clear argument has been made that while, evalua-
tors and evaluation units are well -trained, well-intentioned, and well-positioned 
within organizations to contribute to effective decision-making, there are struc-
tural challenges that have diminished their usefulness, especially in regard to mat-
ters of fiscal discipline and programmatic effectiveness. Most important among 
these is that program evaluation contributes to many forms of assurance, each de-
manding a particular focus, scope, depth, timing, and epistemological orientation.
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The contribution of program evaluation to expenditure reviews given the 
Policy on Results requires a specific set of skills, a defined time frame where analy-
ses become useful, and depth of analysis that cannot always be accommodated in 
traditional effectiveness evaluation studies. One repair is to accept that a separate 
type of evaluation (expenditure evaluation) with an independent and dedicated 
responsibility centre (Curran, 2016) could be created that offers the potential to 
improve evaluation use. A one-size-fits-all approach to program evaluation may 
be an idea well past its prime. Although there are several options considered to 
implement such an idea, ultimately it is likely that expenditure reviews will remain 
a basic public management function, requiring a specific tool to accommodate 
them. In essence, it is time to reorient and focus the function on what it does best: 
contribute to program improvement and organizational learning.
Regardless of whether one adopts a centralized or decentralized approach 
to expenditure evaluation, building a different trust relationship from traditional 
program evaluation will be essential. Such evaluators will need the confidence of 
program managers and department-level decision makers to use data from vari-
ous sources and come to recommendations that make sense in the budget cycle. 
Building such relationships will clearly take time, but the incremental rewards 
may outweigh the investments of effort. As Bourgon (2009) observes, “citizens 
pay the price of failure when governments make the wrong choices, or make 
choices based on poor or misleading information. Evaluation continues to play a 
vital role in government, but it can do more and do better given proper aligning 
of capabilities with decision-makers’ expectations.”
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